Japan: Day of Deceit Notes

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Page 4 of Notes from

Day of Deceit, the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor
by Robert B. Stinnett

Standard history in both Japan and the U.S. is that the attack force maintained radio silence between leaving the Kuriles and striking Pearl Harbor. Those were the orders, but there are records of numerous breaks, as detailed in the book. On November 25 Joseph Rochefort informed Admiral Kimmel that Japanese carriers were in communications with submarines in the central Pacific. Kimmel knew "from reading Rochefort's communiction summary that a large Japanese force of fleet subs and long-range partrol aricraft was heading eastward towards Hawaii from Japan... Naval doctroine held that the presence of enemy submarines forecast a carrier attack." [162-165]

But Kimmel felt he had no choice but to comply with the Vacant Sea direct order of November 24. He was forbidden to fire the first shot. All he could do was alert Washington. Copies were sent to, among others, Arthur McCollum, who was FDR's routing officer. "In the two weeks prior to the attack, Roosevelt's access to Japanese naval intercepts is documented by a series of radio intelligence bulletins, called monographs, that were prepared by McCollum." [165-168]

In response came a November 28, 1941 message from Admiral Stark to Kimmel saying bluntly: "If hostilities cannot repeat connot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." Further, Kimmel's defense preparations were "not to alarm civil population or disclose intent." Along with the Vacant Sea order, this prevented Kimmel from taking an active approach to defending Hawaii. [172-173]

[WPM: nevertheless, the lack of alertness on the part of the Army and Navy personnel in Hawaii is astounding, and reflects poorly on Kimmel and all his officers.]

General Short, in explaining why his fighter planes were not in the air conducting surveillance, cited the order to not alarm the civilian popultion or disclose intent order. [174-175]

Stinnett related interesting details of the decrypting of the "breaking off negotiations" message to the U.S. that arrive just before the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese saw the situation diffently than Cordell Hull and most Americans then and since:

"Obviously it is the intention of the American government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. ... The Japanese government regrets ... that in view of the attitude of the American government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations." [231-231]

Stinnet documents in more detail than I have seen elsewhere how, despite the belief of FDR & crew that this meant war and a surprise attack on Hawaii and the Philippines, no warning was sent to Kimmel or General Short until it was too late to mobilize the troops. [233-237]

Almost immediately, Republicans called for an investigation of why U.S. forces in Hawaii had not been prepared. FDR set up his own inquiry board, the Roberts Commission, but it was not shown Japanese naval intercepts. The report blamed Kimmel and Short for the failure. Evidence was covered up and destroyed. Later investigations were also hampered. [253-260]

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Begins at Day of Deceit notes